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Back in October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he was the fifth consecutive British prime minister to take up the role over a six-year span.

Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is unfolding in the French Republic, now on its fifth prime minister in 24 months – with three in the last ten months?

The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in exchange for opposition Socialist votes as the price for his government’s survival.

But it is, in the best case, a temporary fix. The EU’s number two economic power is trapped in a ongoing governmental crisis, the scale of which it has not witnessed for decades – perhaps not since the start of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.

Minority Rule

Essential context: ever since Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a divided assembly split into three warring blocs – the left, far right and his own centrist coalition – without any group holding a clear majority.

At the same time, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its national debt level and budget shortfall are now almost twice the EU limit, and strict legal timelines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.

In this challenging environment, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who held the position from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In mid-September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he encountered anger from both supporters and rivals.

So much so that the following day, he resigned. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in recent French history. In a dignified speech, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.

A further unexpected development: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for two more days in a final attempt to salvage cross-party backing – a mission, to put it gently, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs openly criticized the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the conclusion of his extension, he appeared on television to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to prevent a vote. The leader's team confirmed the president would appoint a new prime minister 48 hours later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the nation's opposing groups were “creating discord” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a high-stakes speech, the 39-year-old PM spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s controversial pension changes, what they were waiting for: Macron’s flagship reform would be frozen until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would not back no-confidence motions tabled against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the administration would likely endure those votes, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS explicitly warned that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

Changing Political Culture

The issue is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, like the PS, the right-leaning parties are themselves split on dealing with the administration – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A look at the seat numbers shows how difficult his mission – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR seek his removal.

To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in two years is, like his predecessors, toast.

Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by an unlikely turn, the divided parliament musters collective will to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look grim.

So is there a way out? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A fresh premier would confront identical numerical challenges.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After winning the presidential election, his successor would dissolve parliament and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But that, too, is uncertain.

Surveys show the future president will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that France’s voters, having chosen a far-right leader, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

In the end, France may not escape its predicament until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a bygone phenomenon, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Many think that transformation will not be feasible under the existing governmental framework. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the emergence of governing coalitions typical across Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”